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This report presents an analytical framework for exploring the implica-
tions of Fintech innovations for incumbent banks and for provision of the 
financial safety net. The focus is on “digital banking initiatives”, that is, 
on Fintech initiatives that provide retail financial services akin to those 
traditionally provided by banks. Banks perform a wide range of functions 
for individual and institutional customers that help facilitate large-scale 
economic activity. In fact, in most economies the system of financial 
intermediation centres on banks and relies on their core products and 
services for financing of the economy and the maintenance of liquidity. 
On account of the central role banks play in the financial system, along 
with concerns about potential systemic instability linked to the riskiness 
of their activities, these institutions have long been regarded as “spe-
cial”, as reflected in their prudential regulation and coverage under the 
various provisions of the financial safety net. Recent developments raise 
questions about the special status of banks. Two sets of questions are ad-
dressed herein: To what extent do new digital banking initiatives change 
the role that incumbent banks play in the financial system and the way 
that they perform their functions? To what extent are some of the new 
digital banking initiatives securing the benefits of the financial safety net 
without paying the commensurate price? To help address these questions 
the report first revisits the literature on core functions of the financial sys-
tem to provide a framework for analysing recent developments. Particular 
attention is paid in this context to banks and their products and services. 
The “special” role of banks is discussed, which links to the provisions 
of the traditional safety net. These overview sections are followed by 
evidence on Fintech innovations that overlap the core banking products. 
Based on an examination of the characteristics of these new initiatives, 
the study then touches on the issue of whether banks are still special and 
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1. Executive Summary
This report presents an analytical framework for ex-ploring the implications of Fintech innovations for incumbent banks and for provision of the financial 
safety net (FSN). History shows that the FSN is not a rig-
id construct. Its contours and provisions have been altered 
over time as events have required. Recent Fintech devel-
opments in the banking sector are again raising questions 
as to the optimal scope of the FSN. The focus in this con-
text is on “digital banking initiatives”, that is, Fintech ini-
tiatives that provide retail financial services akin to those 
traditionally provided by banks.
Banks provide a bundle of products and services that 
are central to financing of the economy and the main-
tenance of liquidity. Digital banking initiatives overlap 
many of the activities and functions that banks provide 
in the retail market segment, including some of the func-
tions typically deemed to make banks “special” under the 
provisions of the financial safety net. They are effectively 
unbundling and re-bundling retail banking services and 
products, which they provide (1) separately in some cases, 
(2) in re-bundled form together with other services, or (3) 
together with new services or at least in a manner that is 
more convenient for customers.
While increased competition among suppliers of 
products and services in the financial system is generally 
thought to be “good” because it reduces frictions and low-
ers costs for end-users, opinions are more divided when it 
comes to banks. This reflects in part the central role banks 
play in the financial system and the importance of their core 
products and services to financing of the economy but also 
concerns about the potential systemic implications of major 
banking sector instability. In fact, the desire to minimize 
systemic risk and preserve stability of the financial system 
are the principal motivations for bank regulation and safety 
net arrangements consisting of deposit insurance and the 
services of a lender of last resort, with the former repre-
senting the de facto price paid for the protections under 
the FSN1. Factors that make banks special in this context 
include the following three financial functions:
(1) Taking deposits that are withdrawable on demand at 
par;
(2) Providing liquidity to other entities, and thus, given 
the first function, engaging in maturity transformation;
(3) Acting as conduits for the payment system and for 
monetary policy transmission. 
“Specialness” owes in part to the fact that some activi-
1  The literature on deposit insurance notes that while deposit insurance 
can eliminate the incentive for depositors to run and thereby constrain 
risk taking on the part of bank managers, it also gives rise to moral 
hazard, which requires someone else to monitor and discipline banks.
ties, namely deposit taking2 and maturity transformation, 
require the backing of the FSN to the extent they are in-
tended to be performed by private intermediaries. Matu-
rity transformation is necessary to ensure that the system 
has an adequate supply of liquid funds, and the current 
system of fractional reserve banking fundamentally relies 
on banks producing adequate supplies of money. In fact, 
a crucial characteristic of the current system entails banks 
taking demandable deposits and engaging in maturity 
transformation by on lending them at longer maturities. 
These are the two types of activities of banks that are 
linked to most of their own and the financial system’s core 
functions. The fact that banks have historically been the 
only institutions engaged in the joint conduct of these ac-
tivities explains why banks as institutions have uniquely 
been at the core of the financial safety net—beneficiaries 
of its protections but also subject to its costs.
On this point, the report concludes that banks remain 
unique in providing the specific combination of three core 
financial functions listed above. To the extent this bundle 
remains the sole criterion for access to all safety net re-
quirements, then banks will be the only institutions at the 
core of the FSN. However, it is important to note that the 
FSN is not a rigid construct. Rather, its scope has been 
altered over time as events have required. Recent develop-
ments are again raising questions as to the optimal scope 
of the financial safety net. 
For example, digital banking initiatives provide trans-
action accounts, and in many cases, the balances are cov-
ered by deposit insurance. In fact, the report notes that a 
growing number of digital banking initiatives that were 
established independently from incumbent banks have 
applied for and in many cases obtained deposit insurance 
coverage. Banks pay deposit insurance premiums but are 
also regulated to limit the moral hazard of excessive risk 
taking on the financial safety net. Shouldn’t digital bank-
ing initiatives pay a commensurate price?
Digital banking initiatives serve as a reminder of the 
limitations of an entity-based approach to regulation. 
While the need for regulatory and supervisory approaches 
to Fintech to be in principle more activities-based rather 
than entity-based has been acknowledged for some time, 
in practise, the entry point for regulators and supervisors 
remains an entity, and new entities are not automatically 
included within the perimeter of the FSN. Consequently, 
the unbundling and re-bundling of financial services by 
digital banking initiatives implies that financial services 
2  Bank customers in a fractional reserve banking system know their 
deposits are not backed by enough liquid assets. Thus, the only certain 
way to retrieve all their funds in times of uncertainty is to be among the 
first to withdraw funds. even otherwise solvent banks can fail if a large 
enough fraction of its depositors or creditors behave this way.
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that are similar, if not functionally the same, are partly 
provided by regulated incumbent banks and partly by 
new and more lightly (or un-) regulated digital initiatives. 
Where new and lightly regulated digital initiatives are pro-
viding services that are also part of the bundle of services 
provided by banks (and are part of the services that make 
banks special and justify their position at the core of the 
FSN), raises questions about the special status of banks. 
The report argues that banks remain special, not least 
because the consensus view among policy makers and 
central bank officials continues to be that the prevailing 
system of intermediation centred on banks has functioned 
adequately and needs no fundamental change. 
As for the competitive challenge digital banking initia-
tives pose to incumbent banks, it is important to note that 
banks and Fintech initiatives are not always direct com-
petitors. Rather, there are various forms of collaborations 
between incumbent banks and new Fintech initiatives. 
They include contractual relationships, partnerships, and 
acquisitions. These collaborations make it difficult to as-
sess the degree to which digital banking initiatives pose 
a serious competitive threat. The report pays particular 
attention to one form of collaboration—the use of appli-
cation programming interfaces (APIs). The use of APIs 
has been encouraged by regulatory initiatives such as the 
second European Payments Services Directive (PSD2) 
and by “open banking” initiatives introduced or under 
consideration in various jurisdictions, such as the United 
Kingdom and Australia. APIs are becoming the primary 
mechanism by which banks enable third parties to devel-
op applications that run on top of their infrastructure to 
link to the banks’ client bases. The nature of the access 
granted, how access is priced, and the function of the API 
in the structure are keys to understanding what role if any 
the banking licence plays in the relationship. APIs repre-
sent a connection between new digital banking initiatives, 
which might or might not be covered by prudential regu-
lation, with other provisions of the FSN, such as deposit 
insurance. If so, the question of whether an adequate price 
is paid for FSN access needs to be carefully assessed to 
protect the safety net from any potential undue risks.
2. Introduction
The financial services sector has experienced marked 
structural changes over periods of time. The pace of 
change tends to ebb and flow in response to shifts in 
competition and innovation, in deregulation versus re-reg-
ulation, and rising protectionist moves versus initiatives 
to open the marketplace to outside competitors. These 
factors explain the pattern in recent years, with rapid and 
significant improvements in information technology play-
ing a central role. Developments have also been supported 
by an easing or removal of regulatory and other barriers 
to entry in some market segments and aided by changes in 
customer needs and risk preferences. 
The effects of these changes can be seen across the full 
spectrum of financial system value chains, ranging from 
the types of service providers, the range of products and 
services offered, and the distribution channels used to 
deliver them to different types of customers. The process 
of digitalisation has been underway for a few decades, 
although the pace of change has quickened more recently, 
especially as digital infrastructure has been further de-
ployed and as devices like smart phones, which are many 
times faster and more powerful than computers of old, 
provide ubiquitous computing and access.
The digital transformation is having pronounced effects 
across the economy and finance is no exception. Whether 
we are somehow at the cusp of a paradigm shift remains 
to be seen but putting aside the hype that can arise during 
periods of sustained innovation, the potential for further 
marked structural change is quite high. The technological 
shift to digital forms of interaction has already begun to al-
ter the nature of assets that generate value, how ownership 
is imparted and where value is being generated. In turn, 
these shifts change the structure and operation of markets, 
enable the formation of mini-economies or eco-systems and 
ultimately influence how relationships – both economic and 
social – are developed, maintained and located [22].
This report looks at the implications of digital innova-
tions for certain core functions of the financial system. Its 
focus is on the functions typically associated with deposi-
tory institutions (i.e. banks) and the provision of the finan-
cial safety net (FSN). Questions that arise in this context 
include whether banks remain “special” and thus warrant 
the protections afforded by the FSN or, rather, as Bill 
Gates once quipped ‘banking is necessary, banks are not’. 
The types of commercial-loan and deposit-like substitutes 
that have emerged in the financial marketplace move this 
question from the hypothetical realm to the board room, 
pushing banks to become more data-driven and innova-
tive.
The report proceeds as follows: the next section revisits 
the literature on core functions of the financial system to 
provide a framework for analysing recent developments. 
This review leads to consideration of the ways in which 
the functions are achieved, with attention focused on 
retail banking institutions and products. The analysis of 
institutions and products is followed by a discussion of 
the special role of banks, which links to the provisions of 
the traditional safety net. These overview sections are fol-
lowed by evidence on related Fintech innovations in areas 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v3i1.1113
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overlapping the core banking products. We label these 
innovations “digital banking initiatives” to focus on en-
tities or arrangements that are directed at subsets of retail 
banking. The final section offers preliminary conclusions 
regarding the questions whether banks are still special and 
whether new digital banking initiatives are and should be 
given access to the FSN.
3. Core functions of the financial system
3.1 The Financial Intermediation Process
To examine the implications of digital banking initiatives 
for incumbent banks and the FSN we look first at the 
economic functions that are being performed and at the 
underlying products and services that are used. The finan-
cial services business entails a wide range of products and 
activities. Our focus is on the small subset of products 
and activities that relate to the core functions of the finan-
cial system. According to Merton [21], ‘The core function 
of the financial system is to facilitate the allocation and 
deployment of economic resources, both spatially and 
across time, in an uncertain environment’. It is a means 
to an end, namely helping the economy to fully exploit its 
growth potential by ensuring that viable investment op-
portunities receive necessary funding at appropriate costs.
There is both an allocative efficiency effect and a scale 
effect at work here, but it is not completely clear which 
dominates; that is, whether a well-functioning financial 
system improves economic growth primarily through 
higher levels of investment or by targeting investments to 
more productive uses. There is less ambiguity as to what 
happens when the financial system malfunctions.
The financial crisis of the late 1990s is another in a 
long list of examples. It was the result of misallocation on 
a grand scale and the economic and social costs that re-
sulted from it illustrate why so much attention is devoted 
to efforts to avoid crisis outcomes. In fact, what differ-
entiates successful economies from others is the ability 
to reduce the risk and frequency of financial crises and, 
thereby, the costs of shocks.  The FSN is one component 
of these policies. Ensuring the financial system functions 
properly is another.
In general, good financial systems depend on good “in-
stitutions”, which include not only financial intermediaries 
and markets but also properly functioning informational, 
regulatory, legal, and judicial frameworks. This founda-
tion enables the financial system to perform its functions. 
The process seems simple: all it takes is a source of excess 
funds and a roughly offsetting source of demand. The key 
is the intermediation process that brings the two together. 
The challenge is that the needs and preferences of those 
looking to finance projects and those looking to invest 
excess funds may not coincide in terms of time horizons, 
risk tolerances, expected returns/costs, or as regards par-
ticular contract dimensions. 
In the traditional theory of financial intermediation, 
the nature of the information asymmetry between savers 
(sources of funds) and borrowers (users of funds) deter-
mines when direct versus intermediated exchanges will be 
feasible. Intermediaries play a role when the transactions 
costs of intermediated exchange (e.g. costs of search, bar-
gaining, and contracting) are lower than the costs of direct 
transacting between market participants.
In the hypothetical perfect capital market, all transact-
ing is direct and the organisation of economic activity, i.e. 
firms, institutions, and the location of economic agents, is 
irrelevant. There is a frictionless flow of capital. In such 
a market, contracts that cover all future contingencies can 
be concluded at no cost, such that all valuable investment 
opportunities are exploited optimally, and households can 
achieve optimal consumption smoothing and risk sharing 
over their lifecycle. 
In reality, markets are not perfect and frictionless. 
Economic agents do not have identical information sets 
and capital is dispersed across many investors who have 
different time and risk preferences. And ownership of in-
vestment capital is separated from control. 
An extensive literature has discussed the various ar-
rangements in the financial system that address these de-
partures from the ideal. The functions entailed include 3:
(1) Facilitating the exchange of payments, both domes-
tically and across borders; 
(2) Mobilising and pooling scarce and dispersed sav-
ings;
(3) Monitoring investments to ensure adherence to the 
contracts that consumers and investors hold; 
(4) Facilitating the management of risks; 
(5) Producing information about potential investments 
and alternatives for allocating capital;
The result is a matrix of financial institutions, finan-
cial markets, and infrastructure support to perform these 
functions. The markets are the means by which financial 
claims of various kinds are exchanged between parties. 
They also provide the avenues by which financial institu-
tions and their clients manage their financial risks. Finan-
cial institutions are major players in the financial system 
and are the entities on whose balance sheets reside many 
of the risks in the financial system. They include com-
mercial/savings banks, credit unions, postal savings insti-
tutions, finance companies, insurance companies, invest-
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ment banks, collective investment schemes, pension funds 
and other institutional investors. Some institutions confine 
their activities to narrow areas and compete as specialists. 
Other institutions offer a more comprehensive range of 
products through a wide variety of distribution channels. 
Banks are the classic example of a multi-product financial 
intermediary and in most economies are the dominant 
players in the financial system.
3.2 The Special Role of Banks
Banks (and other intermediaries) are a solution to the 
information disparity between borrowers and savers. 
They also add value via diversification (i.e. expanding 
the investment choices available to savers and the sources 
of credit for borrowers, as well as the traditionally im-
portant role of management and diversification of risk) 
and by transforming financial contracts and securities of 
one form, maturity, etc. into another4. Banks are notable 
among intermediaries for their role in helping to reduce 
the risks that funds are mismanaged, by monitoring in-
vestments more efficiently than individual savers would 
be able to do. As well, they are more efficient than indi-
viduals in allocating funds to their most efficient uses, 
given their superior information sets. 
Banks have been at the core of the intermediation pro-
cess. They offer a bundle of products and services and en-
gage in activities that address most of the mismatches dis-
cussed above. The specific activities include safekeeping, 
scaling, searching, screening, contracting, monitoring, and 
enforcing. 5
(1) Safekeeping: Banks offer a range of savings ac-
counts to provide safety for the liquid assets of the public, 
accompanied by accounting statements that enable savers 
to keep track of their income and expenditures. 
(2) Scaling: Banks pool savings from many small sav-
ers in order to provide financing for large-scale projects.
(3) Searching and screening: Banks collect and process 
large amounts of standardised financial information along 
with more specific information on the characteristics of 
individual loan applicants, which helps to avoid adverse 
selection and moral hazard risks arising from information 
asymmetries. This process also helps expand the invest-
ment choices available to savers and the sources of credit 
for borrowers.
(4) Contracting: Banks set their loan terms according 
to the perceived risks of individual borrowers, levying 
higher interest charges and other fees on risky borrowers 
4  As noted by Gurley and Shaw (1960), Benston and Smith (1976) and 
Fama (1980).
5  This list is derived from the one in Chapter 11 of Cecchetti and 
Schoenholtz [10].
and using non-price terms to reduce the risk of default and 
mitigate other agency costs. These contract terms protect 
the bank’s interests but also those of its creditors.
(5) Monitoring and enforcing: In addition to actively 
screening loan applicants, banks also monitor loan recip-
ients to ensure compliance with loan covenants to reduce 
the risks that borrowed funds are mismanaged. Increasing 
returns to scale in monitoring mechanisms enable lenders 
to perform this activity more efficiently than individual 
savers would be able to do. That said, in the event prob-
lems are uncovered, lenders take enforcement actions to 
increase the likelihood of repayment by borrowers. 
These activities are the basic ways in which banks add 
value to the economy. They offer products and services 
that map directly to the list of core functions of the finan-
cial system, as highlighted in Table 1. 
Table 1. Relationship between core functions of banks 
and the core functions of the financial system
Core functions  
of the financial system Core functions of banks Related activity
Payments
Transactions accounts 
(redeemable in cash on 
demand)
Deposit taking

























metric information Delegated monitor Lending
Source: Authors’ extension of Merton [21], shown in first column. 
The entire process evolves from how banks manage 
two sets of cash flows – loans and deposits. Collecting 
small denomination, withdrawable-on-demand deposits 
and transforming them into larger denomination, lon-
ger-term loans or using them in the mediation of various 
other credit, market and duration risks gives rise to two of 
the key activities of banks – liquidity provision and matu-
rity transformation – which in the view of some research-
ers are what make banks “special” (Table 2).
Bank credit can help to bridge the gap between short-
term funds and longer-term equity positions. Moreover, 
banks can provide such credit even in stressful situations, 
drawing initially on their links to other banks to access 
available liquidity through the interbank market and the 
reverse repurchase market, or through the issuance of 
large certificates of deposits. These exchanges of liquidity 
allow the direct and contingent credit facilities from banks 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v3i1.1113
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to serve as a backstop source of liquidity on which other 
credit markets depend. Even when market stress is more 
generalised and affects the banking sector itself, banks can 
rely on their “exclusive” direct links to central banks and 
other provisions of the FSN. As a result of this privileged 
access, banks have been the conduits of (quasi)6 “risk-free 
liquidity” to financial and payment systems.
This access also brings another benefit. It allows the 
public to treat bank liabilities as stores of safe purchasing 
power, which makes deposits a source of stable funding. 
As deposits are backed only partly by reserves under the 
prevailing fractional reserve system, banks in effect create 
money as a by-product of their lending activities. That 
money creation function applies to the entire banking 
system, although some have argued that it applies to each 
individual entity. For example, Werner [29] observes that in 
the process of making credit available in the borrower’s 
bank account, the lending bank does not mechanically 
transfer the money away from other internal or external 
accounts (nor does the bank always check whether such 
transfers were feasible at all), but instead “invents” the 
funds by crediting the borrowers’ account with a deposit, 
6  The financial safety net is only as strong as the public authorities 
backing it.
even though no such deposit had taken place. As a result, 
a bank “can individually create money out of nothing”. 
Be that as it may, if the money created is not complete-
ly misallocated, the economy benefits from this additional 
financing and thereby from the maturity transformation 
between banks’ risky assets and their “safe” liabilities. 
That said, in times of stress, fears on the part of depositors 
about the safety of their funds can result in “runs”, where-
by numerous depositors attempt to withdraw their funds at 
the same time. The same adverse events are also likely to 
prompt draws against the binding liquidity commitments 
banks have made. This sudden mismatch between assets 
and liabilities, the core of the fragility problem of banks, 
can result in rapid outflows.  
Banks hold buffer stocks of liquid assets to handle un-
anticipated outflows, but while they bear all the costs of 
the buffer, they do not capture all the social benefits and, 
hence, may not always have incentives to hold enough. In 
the event a bank’s liquidity buffer falls short, it is forced 
to find liquidity elsewhere, either by borrowing in the 
interbank market or by selling assets. Either option can 
prove elusive. For example, selling assets in a stressed 
market environment to meet short-term liquidity demands 
risks getting prices well below the assets’ intrinsic quality, 
Table 2. What makes banks special?
Source Factors that make banks special
Boot and Thakor [5]
The first raison d’être for banks relates to their capacity as information processors and delegated monitors, and these 
aspects are primarily related to the management of credit risk. The second raison d’être relates to the provision of liquidity. 
Banks invest in illiquid assets but finance themselves with highly liquid demand deposits, and through this intermediation 
process, they create liquidity in the economy.
Huertas [19]
Banks are special, as non-banks (individuals and institutions have their accounts at banks; banks have accounts at the 
central bank. Individuals and institutions therefore use banks to access the payment system. Banks lend to non-banks and 
provide the economy at large with a liquidity backstop.
Werner [29] Banks are different from non-bank financial institutions “because they can individually create money out of nothing.”
Gande and Saunders [17] Various scholars have argued that banks are special, due to the monitoring that they provide in connection with loans. How-ever, other financiers (notably private equity firms) also monitor firms in which they invest or to whom they extend credit.
Olson [23]
Significant increases in international capital flows among bank and non-bank entities, in addition to a broad range of 
specialized financial instruments, mean banks can no longer be considered the only source of transaction accounts. Except 
for their access to the Federal Reserve discount window, banks are no longer the dominant provider of liquidity for other fi-
nancial industries. However, banks remain the key access point to the dominant wholesale payments network, and they still 
provide federally insured checking and savings deposits. With the rise of new financial services, products, and techniques, 
moreover, banks have expanded their role in providing liquidity in more indirect ways, for example, through securitization 
of loans and backup commitments to securitization vehicles and other capital-markets instruments. Even when banks may 
not be "special" or unique providers in a particular market, banks have proven themselves to be formidable competitors 
and innovators – which only reinforces banks' importance in the proper functioning of our financial system. In short, the 
public's trust and confidence in banking continue to be vital to our financial well-being.
Calomiris [6]
“The social value of banking arises from banks' specializing in information creation and contract enforcement (the so-
called delegated-monitoring function of banks). Although this delegation makes it costly for outsiders to monitor the risk-
iness of bank assets, such intermediation is highly productive since it economizes on the costs of information and control 
by creating banks that specialize in these activities. ... The regulation of bank risk could be accomplished easily because 
deposit risk would be costlessly observable to everyone. But without asymmetric information, there would also be no need 
for banks, much less a bank safety net.”
Corrigan [12]
Corrigan identifies three characteristics that distinguish banks from other types of financial institutions. These characteris-
tics have to be jointly present for a bank to be considered “special”: 1) offering transactions accounts redeemable in cash 
on demand; 2) serving as the backup source of liquidity for all other institutions and individuals; and 3) as conduits for the 
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which can worsen rather than ameliorate an institution’s 
problems (i.e. on account of the implied hit to capital).
Moreover, both fire sales of assets and the failure of the 
bank can have spillover effects on other financial insti-
tutions and the broader economy, which result at least in 
part from accompanying contractions in credit availability. 
It is this externality that creates a role for policy. 
The role intermediaries play in an economy influences 
the relative weight assigned to them and their products 
and services in the overall regulatory framework and the 
financial sector is special compared with many other sec-
tors of the economy. It faces a greater risk of instability, 
both at the level of individual financial intermediaries and 
markets and at the level of the overall financial system. 
For similar reasons, banks are special among intermedi-
aries. Most governments provide support for the liquidity 
and sometimes even the solvency of banks to reduce the 
likelihood of panic and the spread of the difficulties to the 
real economy. Functioning under this support structure 
has been the privileged position of banks.
3.3 Digital Channels of Financial Intermediation
In periods of rapid change in the provision of financial 
services, one can lose sight of the fact that the basic needs 
being met remain more or less the same. In this context, 
retail clients still have a need for some type of current 
account, for loans to finance large purchases and invest-
ments, for financial advice, and for remittance capabilities 
and money transfers. What is changing, from the view-
point of the end-users, is how the needs are met.
Banks have traditionally provided a bundle of products 
and services, often without being the low-cost provider 
of any of them. Operating under the shelter of the FSN, 
banks could rely on the stickiness of their retail client 
base, which had a strong preference for safety of their de-
posit funds and stayed with their existing provider, often 
even when better terms were on offer elsewhere, trading 
off security and on-demand access for higher returns. 
Hence, banks have been the primary repositories for the 
savings of the retail public.
In the expanding digital space, that close link between 
a bank branch and the saving/borrowing public has begun 
to loosen in favour of digital interfaces. The channels 
through which funds flow from sources of funds to users 
are being altered by the new digital technologies and re-
lated services, which replicate some of the functions typ-
ically performed by banks, including liquidity provision, 
credit intermediation, foreign exchange operations and 
especially payments services. The question arises as to 
whether banks will continue to control the current account 
as the primary interface with the retail banking clientele. 
The answer depends in part on the relative importance to 
customers of the bundle of services provided by banks 
versus the unbundled equivalent available separately.
Digital banking initiatives are performing several retail 
banking functions, although available evidence indicates 
that the distribution of initiatives across functions is un-
equal. For example, a recent stock-taking of the Fintech 
landscape in France suggests that funding, payments and 
foreign exchange operations are particularly affected, if 
judged by the number of Fintech entities [28]. As of end-
2017, 285 Fintech entities were identified, with the ma-
jority related to a narrow subset of functions traditionally 
performed by deposit-taking banks. 
Looking across a broad range of jurisdictions, one finds 
different operational models, technology employed, prod-
uct features, and entities. Three common types of initia-
tives in the payments, clearing and settlement, credit, and 
deposit categories include digital or mobile banks, mobile 
wallets, and peer-to-peer (online) platforms. 
3.4 Digital Banks and Related Initiatives
In the mid-2000s, references to digital banks typically 
referred to online banks launched by traditional banks, 
which were aimed at those customers drawn to the flexi-
bility of remote banking relationships and the more attrac-
tive pricing it offered. These days, the “digital bank” label 
applies to a range of initiatives that make extensive use 
of technology (e.g. via smartphone apps or internet-based 
platforms) to offer retail banking services, including cur-
rent and deposit accounts, credit cards, financial advice, 
and loans. The entities take various forms depending on 
the products offered and the laws of the resident jurisdic-
tion. For example, some jurisdictions limit ‘deposit-taking’ 
to entities specifically licensed as “banks”. Where that is 
the case, a digital bank must be an entity in possession of 
a banking licence, with all the requirements this entails. 
Digital banking initiatives in this context can take differ-
ent forms. They may be stand-alone entities or subsidiar-
ies of existing banks or even of non-financial companies, 
where rules permit. Table 3 provides a side-by-side com-
parison of three different digital banking initiatives (to be 
distinguished from licenced banks) to illustrate some of 
the differences in the structure and operations of mobile 
banking entities. 
The “digital bank” label is sometimes misapplied to en-
tities that are not, strictly speaking, banks, although they 
may offer some traditional banking products and services. 
Mobile banking entities in this category offer a fully mod-
ernised and fully digital relationship model, often based on 
big data technologies and advanced data analytics. Being 
fully digital means they are unencumbered by legacy in-
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frastructure, which enables them to adopt and employ new 
technology at lower cost and more rapidly than incumbent 
institutions and in a more modern format.  Such mobile 
banking entities typically target individuals, entrepreneurs 
and small to medium-sized enterprises, particularly those 
customers that have not been served by traditional banks, 
such as the unbanked and the underbanked. 
Mobile banking entities may link their operations with 
scalable infrastructure through cloud providers or API-
based systems to better interact through online, mobile 
and social media-based platforms. 
3.5 E-Wallet
Another category of digital service provider in the pay-
ments, clearing and settlement category is the mobile 
wallet or eWallet for short. The eWallet is an innovative 
payment mechanism most often executed by use of a con-
nected device such as a smartphone. Many mobile wallets 
have been developed by third–party technology compa-
nies and include Apple Pay7, Samsung Pay, and Android 
Pay as common examples, but others have been launched 
by the likes of MasterCard, Alibaba, and Tencent. 
Digital wallets allow money to be withdrawn on de-
mand and at par or to be transferred on demand to anoth-
er eligible account. The funds in such digital wallets in 
turn could in principle be invested in risky, longer-term 
fixed-maturity and/or illiquid assets. In this case, the dig-
ital wallets would engage in maturity, liquidity or credit 
risk transformation, although they would not be covered 
by commensurate prudential regulation. As a general rule, 
funds are required to be held in safe assets. For example, 
in the European Union (EU), the E-Money Directive re-
quires e-money providers to invest the funds of digital 
wallets with transaction functions in bank deposits or 
fairly safe assets such as government bonds. So far, digital 
wallets are not systemically important. Despite consider-
able and perhaps even increasing competition in this area, 
7  Apple Pay is a mobile payments scheme largely used offline in a 
physical store, or for transit. PayPal, by contrast, is a digital payments 
scheme, used to shop online and in apps and via a mobile browser with 
mobile devices.
Table 3. Features of selected financial service providers in the areas of deposits, payments and credit (free retail ac-
counts in France)
Orange Banque Revolut N26
Deposit-taking
Bank charter YES (France) NO (e-wallet, United Kingdom) YES (Germany)
Offering transaction accounts YES YES YES
Taking deposits YES NO YES
Deposit protection Deposit insurance (Fonds de  Ga-rantie des Dépôts et de Résolution)
Segregation (Segregated Revolut 
account at Barclays Bank)
Deposit insurance (Compensa-
tion Scheme of German Banks)
Organised as resident bank YES (France) NO YES (Germany)
Subsidiary of other firm/bank YES (non-financial firm Orange) NO NO
Branch of other firm/bank NO NO NO
Passporting NO YES (in several EU countries) YES (in 17 EU countries)
Payments
Payment provider YES YES YES
Credit card NO NO NO
Debit card YES (with Visa) YES (with Visa) YES (with MasterCard)
Receive bank transfers YES YES YES
Recurrent payments YES YES YES
Domestic transfers YES YES YES
International transfers YES YES (in 26 currencies) YES (in 19 currencies with part-ner TransferWise)
Lending
Making loans YES NO YES (with partner platforms)
Note: This table does not take into account the potential implications of the announcement on 13 December 2018 by Revolut (see blog.revolut.com; 
retrieved on 15 January 2019) that the ECB has approved the company’s application for a European banking license. That announcement states “nothing 
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network effects could imply that one financial service pro-
vider comes to dominate specific markets.
Most e-Wallets are offered in conjunction with a part-
ner bank, in a distributed bank scenario, whereby the bank 
in question offers third-party wallets. In contrast, some 
banks have developed mobile wallets in-house.
3.6 Marketplace Platforms (Peer-to-peer, Online, 
Mobile platforms)
Lending platforms are another digital-based means of fa-
cilitating financial retail transactions. Automation of lend-
ing processes is achieved through the setting of lending 
criteria in terms of risk, maturity, amounts, etc., resulting 
in transactional costs of financial intermediation below 
those of traditional banks. Lending platforms use alterna-
tive sources of data and scoring models to evaluate credit 
applications. Such data could include utility payments, 
rent payment history, insurance claims, use of mobile 
phones, social media, sales data, or other personal data of 
consumers that traditional banking organizations may not 
typically use. 
Some commentators claim that the use of alternative 
sources of data may result in expanded access, a faster 
turn-around of credit decisions, convenience, and reduced 
costs, which succeeds not only in reducing the cost of 
funding to usual borrowers but also in expanding credit 
access, particularly for the unbanked and the underbanked.
Others point out that more analysis is needed to deter-
mine whether alternative sources of data are better than 
traditional sources or instead more prone to errors and 
inaccuracies, and whether they may create unfair disad-
vantages for consumers and lead to disparate impacts and 
violations of fair lending rules. It is essential for the new 
financial service providers, like traditional lenders, to 
ensure the security of the collection, use and disclosure 
of personal and sensitive consumer information in order 
to avoid the potential harm to consumers of a data breach 
and any privacy law violations.8 
Many countries have set up specific regulation applying 
to either one or both types of platforms. Country-specific 
regulatory approaches were reviewed by the Financial 
Stability Board and Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS/FS, 2017), and, for Europe, by the Europe-
an Securities and Markets Authority [14] and Havrylchyk [18]. 
8  For example, New York State’s Department of Financial Services 
released a report recommending additional regulations for online lenders, 
which emphasizes that existing consumer protection laws and usury 
limits apply equally to online lenders as well as chartered institutions. 
Reportedly, “Financial Services Superintendent Maria T. Vullo noted that 
borrowers, whether consumers or small businesses, require protection, 
and banks deserve a ‘level playing field’”. See New York Department of 
Financial Services at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/online_lending_
survey_rpt_07112018.pdf.
While all platforms are similar in the sense of connecting 
lenders and borrowers directly, various types of contracts 
are involved. Havrylchyk proposes a classification based 
on a taxonomy developed by the Cambridge Centre for 
Alternative Finance, which is used in Table 4 to list and 
categorise selected platforms.
Table 4. Examples of activities of selected lending plat-
forms
Broad type of financial contrast Entities
Credit to consumers
Zopa and Ratesetter in the United King-
dom, Prosper and Lending Club in the 
United States, Bondora in Estonia
Credit to SMEs
Funding Circle in the United Kingdom, 
Geldvoorelkaar in the Netherlands, 
Lendix and Unilend in France
Property-secured lending to 
property developers
LendInvest in the United Kingdom, 
Investly in Estonia
SMEs sale of invoices to inves-
tors
MarketInvoice in the United Kingdom, 
Investly in Estonia
Investments in sustainable 
development
Lendosphere in France, Abundance in 
the United Kingdom
Source: Adapted from Havrylchyk [18], based on the taxonomy developed 
by Cambridge Centre for the Alternative Finance. 
As these examples suggest, digital banking initiatives 
are performing a number of retail banking services (Table 
5). Some initiatives focus on activities that would be more 
likely to attract only certain groups of customers, such as 
younger populations who embrace technology and are less 
averse to switching providers and international popula-
tions (e.g. ex-pats) who have a need for cross-border pay-
ment services. However, other initiatives, namely those 
providing basic safekeeping and transactions accounts, 
offer products and services that comprise the initial com-
ponents of the typical financial retail customer interface, 
which often serves as the gateway to the associated full 
value chain.
Table 5. Core functions & activities of banks and FinTech 
initiatives
Core functions/activities of 
banks
Functions that make 
banks “special” under 
the FSN
Functions of digital 













in cash on demand)
Offering transactions 
accounts (DB, eW)
Liquidity provision Liquidity provision Liquidity provision (DB, eW)
Maturity transformation Maturity transforma-tion
Clearing and settling 
transactions (payments)
Clearing and settling 
payments
Facilitating the ex-
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Serving as conduits for 
transmission of monetary 
policy










assessment) Credit scoring (P)




Notes: DB = digital bank; eW = eWallet; API = automated programming 
interface; P = online platform.
4. Exploring Linkages between Digital Bank-
ing Initiatives and Banks
4.1 APIs and the Positioning of Fintech Initiatives 
Relative to Incumbent Banks 
Taken as a group, digital banking initiatives overlap sev-
eral of the activities and functions that banks provide in 
the retail market segment. A point that may not be readily 
apparent in the descriptions of selected digital banking 
initiatives is that bank accounts are often still part of the 
intermediation process, especially as regards many digital 
payments methods. Banks are involved in such digital ini-
tiatives in numerous ways, both directly and in partnership 
with other entities.
One structure that is becoming a more common ap-
proach in the digital transformation of banking services is 
the use of application programming interfaces (APIs) to 
link banks’ own infrastructures to innovative digital prod-
ucts developed by third-party developers. APIs allow for 
the automatic transfer of funds from one account to anoth-
er.
The use of APIs has clearly been encouraged by regu-
latory initiatives such as the second European Payments 
Services Directive (PSD2) and by “open banking” ini-
tiatives introduced or under consideration in various ju-
risdictions, such as the United Kingdom. But many large 
banks appear to have settled on their use independently, as 
part of their own digital transformation. The exact nature 
of the embedded protocol varies depending on the partic-
ular application but, in general, the API specifies all the 
components necessary to perform the intended interaction, 
including who is allowed access and the format used in 
the exchange, the underlying data and the type of connec-
tion required to enable the particular function or operation 
to be conducted.
The details obviously matter but, for the purposes here, 
it suffices to state that APIs are becoming the primary 
mechanism by which banks enable third parties to develop 
applications that run on top of their infrastructure to link 
to their client bases. The nature of the access granted and 
how it is priced and the function of the API in the struc-
ture are keys to understanding what role if any the bank-
ing licence plays in the relationship. 
4.2 Other Collaborations between Digital Bank-
ing Initiatives and Incumbent Banks
The positioning of digital banking initiatives within in the 
banking ecosystem varies, but many initiatives increasing-
ly operate within the framework of a partnership with es-
tablished players. Collaborations between banks and Fin-
tech initiatives take various forms, including contractual 
relationships, partnerships and acquisitions. For example, 
Figure 1 distinguishes between the initiative producing 
financial products and services and the entity maintaining 
the interface with the customer, depending on what the 
new initiative is actually doing, for example, competing 
with existing service providers, distributing the products 
of existing providers or providing new financial services. 
For example, a report by the Financial Stability Board 
and Committee on the Global Financial System (FSB/
CGFS, 2017) distinguishes between four types of inter-
actions between traditional banks and lending platforms. 
These are:
(1) for banks to provide specific operational services 
to the platforms, such as payment and settlement services 
and custodial services; 
(2) for banks to originate loans on the behalf of lending 
platforms; 
(3) partnership agreements that, for example, require 
that borrowers denied credit from a bank are referred to 
lending platforms; 
(4) direct investments.
Figure 1. Positioning of new players in relation to incum-
bents
Source: Autorité de Contrôle prudential et de resolution [1]. 
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Incumbents might acquire Fintech entities for strategic 
reasons and to complement their own portfolio of services 
offered or providing similar services at lower costs. One 
motivation might also simply be “If you can’t beat them, 
buy them.” An overview of selected Fintech acquisitions 
by banks is provided in Table 6.
According to some consultancy reports, a new strategy 
is for incumbents to acquire digital applications or enti-
ties in their early stage (start-ups) and develop their own 
Fintech arrangements in-house. In April 2018, Santander 
announced that it had launched a cross-border payments 
system based on blockchain, using that technology with a 
view to competing with payment services such as Trans-
ferWise. The system, called One Pay FX, was developed 
over two years and uses distributed ledger technology de-
veloped by California-based Ripple, in which Santander’s 
InnoVentures venture capital fund had invested in 2015. 
In other developments also involving US blockchain spe-
cialist Ripple, a few Japanese banks have started offering 
customers free, real-time money transfers via new mobile 
apps.
4.3 Direct Establishment of Digital Banking Ini-
tiatives by Banks
An alternative to acquisition of Fintech start-ups by banks 
is the establishment of their own in-house initiatives. In 
the past, circa the mid-2000s, digital transformation by 
banks mainly implied the launch of an online bank, which 
fulfilled the needs of those customers tempted by the 
flexibility of remote customer relationships and attrac-
tive pricing policies. Today, most French banking groups 
have a banking solution that is fully remote (online, via 
mobile or via telephone). Those banks that until recently 
did not offer this service have decided to launch their own 
offering, as they have become increasingly aware that a 
fully remote solution attracts certain groups of people (i.e. 
young and international populations or people who would 
be likely to switch providers).
The tightening of the regulatory and supervisory frame-
work, especially for large and complex banks, might ex-
plain the timing by which incumbent or traditional banks 
have participated in digital initiatives. Discussion in the 
trade press suggests that banks’ IT budgets are stable over 
a period of years and initially the regulatory tightening 
was reflected in banks allocating IT investments in a way 
that facilitated their compliance with the new regulation. 
Once these new systems were in place, banks started to 
allocate IT investments more towards new initiatives that 
would support revenue-generation further down the road.
In this context, banks in many jurisdictions have be-
gun to develop their own mobile applications, although 
in some cases significant investment is still required to 
further improve application ergonomics and enhance 
functionality beyond the most basic operations. At a min-
imum, banks are endeavouring to retain their relationship 
with customers and remain their first financial partner, by 
offering a broader range of products and services to serve 
customers over the long term. Maintaining control of 






















































Source: Authors’ assessments and CBInsights [9], https://www.cbinsights.com/reports/CB-Insights_Banks-In-Fintech-Briefing.pdf  
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everyday payment and banking services is central in the 
battle for customers, as reflected in the establishment of 
digital banks by most incumbent institutions.
5. Examining Financial Safety Net Trade-offs 
Related to Digital Banking Initiatives
5.1 Deposit-taking and Maturity Transformation
Some banking activities require the backing of the FSN if 
private intermediaries are to perform them. Deposit taking 
and maturity transformation are the two types of activi-
ties of banks that are linked to most of their own and the 
financial system’s core functions (see Table 5). And it is 
the performance of these activities that explains why the 
provisions of the FSN protect banks. 
Maturity transformation (i.e. taking deposits and on 
lending them) is necessary to ensure that the system has 
an adequate supply of liquid funds, and the current sys-
tem of fractional reserve banking fundamentally relies on 
banks producing adequate supplies of money. Other sys-
tems have existed at different points in time and proposals 
have been made to reconsider the current system.9
The lender-of-last resort function and, to some extent, 
the deposit insurance function are meant to avoid “runs”. 
Any financial intermediary, and not just commercial 
banks, performing maturity transformation is subject to 
“runs”. While “runs” on insolvent financial firms can 
be efficient or not, runs on illiquid but solvent firms are 
always inefficient as long as there are transaction costs in-
volved in the resolution of a failing financial firm. In fact, 
a market failure arises because of asymmetric information 
and the initial normative function of the lender of last re-
sort was to provide support to solvent but illiquid banks 
in the face of liquidity shocks, associated with their tradi-
tional business model of taking deposits withdrawable on 
demand and lending out the funds over longer-term fixed 
periods. 
The deposit insurance function primarily protects de-
positors, while the lender-of-last-resort function primarily 
protects the system (although in doing so it also protects 
depositors as well as other end-users of the financial sys-
9  In Switzerland, a recent popular referendum on a proposal to to make 
the Swiss National Bank (SNB) the sole issuer of money and end the 
traditional system was rejected on Sunday, 10 June 2018. Over 75% 
of Swiss voters rejected the Initiative “For crisis-resistant money: end 
fractional-reserve banking (Vollgeld)”. The proposal contained several 
elements. Financial institutions could manage transactional accounts 
for customers but must hold equivalent assets with the Swiss National 
Bank. Commercial banks would have been prevented from “creating” 
money when issuing loans, thus effectively ending fractional reserve 
banking, under which only a fraction of deposits held by banks on behalf 
of customers are backed by notes and coins or banks’ deposits at central 
banks.
tem).
There are, however, some important caveats to the 
provision of both the lender-of-last-resort and the deposit 
insurance functions. First, access to these provisions of 
the FSN are counterbalanced by additional restrictions 
imposed by a bank regulatory framework, implementation 
of and adherence to which is enforced by supervision. The 
regulatory and supervisory functions are the quid-pro-
quo for access to the deposit insurance and lender-of-last 
resort functions. Second, out of concern that the safety net 
does not become overextended, policy makers have not 
only limited the extent of deposit coverage but have also 
limited deposit taking to a limited set of institutions. The 
set includes commercial banks and, in principle, entities 
licensed to provide related commercial-bank-like func-
tions.
The recent global financial crisis served notice that 
the dimensions of the regulatory framework cannot fo-
cus solely on microprudential concerns but, rather, must 
also entail a macroprudential approach. To be effective in 
maintaining financial stability it is not sufficient to focus 
on the safety and soundness of an individual institution, 
but also to consider the level and distribution of risk at the 
aggregate level, given the close interconnections among 
banks through interbank claims, derivatives transactions, 
and similar portfolio compositions. These interlinkages 
are not stable over time; they change as part of the dy-
namic nature of the financial system. New and emerging 
financial technologies are among the factors transforming 
the nature and extent of these interlinkages.
The crisis also made it clear that the speed of resolution 
is also a key issue in restoring calm and that traditional 
corporate insolvency rules are ineffective when it comes 
to ensuring that failure resolution of a large financial firm 
does not precipitate a contagious collapse of the system. 
Hence, while resolution frameworks for banks were in the 
past linked mainly to deposit insurance, more recently, 
a wider set of arrangements has been adopted to ensure 
smooth and efficient exit of large financial firms.
One new element concerns the function of the guaran-
tor-of-last-resort, which was introduced de facto10 as part 
of the financial safety net as part of the policy response 
to the global financial crisis. It consisted of assurance to 
financial market participants that the safety of the liabili-
ties (and sometimes even assets) of financial intermediar-
ies would be guaranteed by public authorities to avoid a 
potential “run” on banks by counterparties and creditors. 
Policy makers in some jurisdictions announced that bank 
10  One can argue that it was always more or less present, given that 
many governments have stepped in to provide guarantees when faced 
with systemic banking problems.
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deposits would be protected without limits, Ministries of 
Finance set up various funds to protect specific types of fi-
nancial firm liabilities (and in some cases also assets), and 
central banks gave assurance that central bank liquidity 
would always be ample). 
In discussing the initial policy response to the global 
financial crisis, the OECD Committee on Financial Mar-
kets opined that the addition of the guarantor-of-last-re-
sort function was perhaps necessary to avoid a worst-case 
outcome but noted that this response was not costless. The 
costs include the perception that some banks are so “spe-
cial” that their debt is implicitly insured by public author-
ities, which means they are unlikely to be forced to exit 
the market, at least not in an uncontrolled way. Current 
financial regulatory reform explicitly aims to reign in such 
expectations, although one can ask how successful that 
exercise will prove to be [26].
5.2 Deposit Insurance and Digital Banking Initia-
tives
5.2.1 The Customer Perspective
Where deposit insurance exists in sufficient coverage 
amounts, it largely eliminates the contagion effect where-
by depositors flee the system when an unaffiliated institu-
tion is in trouble. It also substantially reduces their incen-
tive to flee their own institution in times of trouble. This 
protection has its obvious benefits in the sense of helping 
to maintain calm, but it also has potential drawbacks. 
The primary drawback of the safety net is “moral haz-
ard”. The risk is particularly acute in the case of deposit 
insurance.11 History suggests that in order for a deposit 
insurance system to succeed as a stabilising mechanism, 
it must cover a sufficiently high monetary value of de-
posits to remove the incentive for depositors to run at the 
sign (or perception) of problems. But once the coverage 
amount becomes high enough to remove the incentive for 
depositors to run, it has the potential to create incentives 
for banks either to hold less than the socially optimal level 
of liquid reserves or, worse, hold an excessive amount of 
risky assets. In short, there is a trade-off between the abil-
ity of a deposit insurance system to prevent runs on banks 
and the soundness of the incentives it gives to depositors 
and bank managers.12 
As with most policy trade-offs, there is no obvious 
11  The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance arises 
from the potential for the deposit-taking institution, the depositor, or 
both to be less “prudent” than might otherwise occur, relying instead on 
the existence of the state-supported safety net to underwrite mistakes.
12  A voluminous economic literature analyses deposit insurance with 
contrasting views both on whether such systems should be introduced 
and how best to make them incentive compatible. 
place where to draw the line between too much and not 
enough coverage. Most governments have proceeded by 
creating a deposit insurance system to maintain the confi-
dence of depositors in the banking system, but they have 
accompanied it with various design elements such as up-
front pricing13 to avoid or minimise negative side effects. 
Responsibility for paying for deposit insurance cover-
age rests, in principle, with banks, as they and their clients 
are the direct beneficiaries of an effective system. But the 
likelihood of a deposit insurance payout is not evenly dis-
tributed among banks, being higher in the case of finan-
cially weaker institutions. If participation in the system is 
voluntary, it is the higher-risk banks that have the greater 
incentive to opt-in, while stronger, lower-risk banks would 
have less incentive to participate; hence, the reference to 
adverse selection. 
The potential for uneven burden sharing can arise 
whenever the risks to the system posed by covered in-
stitutions are unbalanced across the pool. As a general 
rule, the deposit insurer will want to monitor the portfolio 
decisions of member banks to ensure that the system is 
not exposed to unacceptable risk. Even an incentive-com-
patible deposit insurance scheme needs to be supported by 
appropriate regulatory and supervisory practices to ensure 
that banks adhere to high capital adequacy standards, ob-
serve proper market conduct, and are fair and honest in 
their dealings with clients and customers. Monitoring is 
most easily accomplished when all participants operate 
under the same regulatory regime, with a similar approach 
to prudential supervision and oversight.
In some deposit insurance systems, the ability of the 
deposit insurer to control the risks the system assumes 
is facilitated by granting the deposit insurer control over 
entry criteria for membership in the system. But in other 
systems, membership in the deposit insurance scheme 
is granted automatically upon a depository institution’s 
receipt of a banking licence or is instead a condition for 
receiving the licence. 
This discussion on eligibility for deposit insurance cov-
erage is relevant for the topic at hand. For instance, should 
accounts at digital banking initiatives be covered by the 
traditional deposit insurance system? On the one hand, the 
desire to ensure adequate protection for retail investors 
supports covering all retail “deposits”, including those 
held at digital banking initiatives. But on the other, many 
digital banking initiatives lack a banking licence and are 
not subject to the same form of regulation as existing 
member banks. Including them in the deposit insurance 
pool could expose the deposit insurance system to unfa-
13  A typical deposit insurance premium paid by banks is in the range of 
0.1% to 0.5% of insured deposits.
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miliar risks. 
To decide which hand is chosen requires a better un-
derstanding of what type of account we are addressing. As 
part of the digitalisation of retail finance, both incumbent 
banks and new entities use new financial technologies to 
provide specific financial services that were previously 
provided in bundled form by banks, or they provide alto-
gether new financial services. Many of these services are 
in the payments area.
Table 7. Maturity transformation and liquidity provision 
services provided by different institutions (Example using 





Banks Passbook savings accounts FDIC insurance
Banks Certificates of deposits (CDs) & small time deposits
FDIC 
insurance





Money market mutual funds, offering 
interest rate and immediate withdrawal 
at par or payable-through drafts





e-wallet, offering returns on assets and 
allowing transfers
No, at least 
not explicitly
Note: “Entity” either identifies the financial intermediary that incurs 
a liability on its own balance sheet as a result of the execution of the 
economic function or in cases where there is no such liability it specifies 
“security”.
Source: Authors’ assessments.
5.2.2 The Provider Perspective
The provision of services related to payments, includ-
ing money transfers, and foreign exchange transactions, 
has historically been the province of banks, given their 
front-end relationships with customers, their links to other 
banks via the inter-bank market, and their direct access 
to central bank facilities. Depending on the nature of an 
institution and the jurisdiction in which it operates, a bank 
may offer various types of transactions accounts, giving 
account owners often-immediate access to funds and en-
abling them to transfer funds to third parties in a variety 
of ways – for a fee.
The current account is often the main interface between 
retail customers and banks. It bundles together several 
services, including safekeeping, payments and transfers, 
and short-term credit in the guise of overdraft protection, 
and sits at the core of banks’ efforts to cross-sell more 
advanced products and services over time to the retail 
segment. This arrangement – based on long-term relation-
ships between consumers and service providers – has long 
been the essence of the retail market segment. 
New digital banking initiatives seek to unbundle these 
services into separable components. As noted by Mark 
Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, “FinTech’s true 
promise springs from its potential to unbundle banking 
into its core functions of: settling payments, performing 
maturity transformation, sharing risk and allocating capi-
tal…” Their eventual success, especially in terms of scale, 
will depend not only on unbundling the products and 
services but also on unbundling the retail customers from 
their existing banks.
The conventional view is that banks tend to specialise 
in lending to customers for whom adequate information 
on payment histories is lacking, a category that includes 
individuals and new and small businesses. But there is a 
caveat. Banks have economic incentives to invest in such 
customers if they can develop long-term relationships 
with them that enable the banks to recoup the costs of the 
initial investment in information gathering. In the case 
of small businesses, costs would also entail nurturing the 
firms along. For banks, the true benefit from the relation-
ship accrues over time to the extent they can extract sur-
plus rents through subsequent lending to the customer or 
through additional fee-generating business as the custom-
er relationship matures. 
The benefits of these banking relationships are not nec-
essarily one-sided, however, if the underlying information 
asymmetry persists. Retail customers may benefit from 
the maintenance of a long-term relationship with a given 
service provider, the capitalised value of which may be 
sacrificed if they switch to another institution that does 
not know them as well. The rationale in this case is the 
potential adverse selection problem the new service pro-
vider faces. Because the existing relationship is based on 
privileged information, a new institution would not know 
in advance the quality of a prospective client. Owing to 
this information asymmetry, a high-quality customer at-
tempting to switch from an institution with which it has 
an established relationship to a new provider may initially 
encounter unfavourable terms – those typically offered to 
lower quality customers.
The presumed information problem is used to explain 
why retail customers tend to stick with a given service 
provider, even when better value products are available 
elsewhere. Retail customers appear to value a good rep-
utation and the perception that an institution is safe more 
highly than the savings from lower fees and prices avail-
able elsewhere. Ultimately, they become, in effect, “locked 
in” with their existing service provider and are likely to 
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Viewed from the perspective of alternative service pro-
viders, the existence of inelastic demand curves arising 
from this behaviour of retail consumers is a type of mar-
ket entry barrier. What advantage is there for an institution 
to invest in technology to become a low-cost provider of 
a given product or service if consumers prefer long-term 
relationships with their existing provider and are rela-
tively insensitive to price? If customers find it costly to 
switch from one service provider to another for whatever 
reason, then the existing service provider gains, at least in 
principle, a measure of market power over customers with 
whom it has an established relationship, which also pro-
vides some protection against rival providers.
The existence of high switching costs in the retail 
market segment continues to be a major concern in com-
petition policy circles14, where a decided preference exists 
for market configurations that enable consumers to switch 
readily from one service provider to another (e.g. flexi-
ble distribution channels). These configurations have the 
potential to offset (somewhat) the otherwise conservative 
tendencies of retail customers. 
This reasoning explains the rise in open banking initia-
tives in several jurisdictions, which aim to foster competi-
tion and innovation by opening up access by third parties 
to bank customer data, albeit with explicit consent by the 
customer, and allowing customers to use third parties for 
payments-related services. Such third parties could in-
clude other banks, small and large technology firms and 
new payment providers. 
5.2.3 The Interface between the Retail Customer 
and Service Provider
At a micro level, retail consumers of financial products 
and services have idiosyncratic information endowments 
(i.e. what they know) and therefore needs (i.e. what they 
should know), reflecting their individual circumstances 
and risk preferences. These individual characteristics 
carry through to the behaviour of financial consumers, 
which can differ across such demographic characteristics 
as age and gender, and income levels, while culture and 
related social factors are also relevant in some contexts. 
These differences are reflected in the uptake of digital 
banking initiatives, where for example estimates suggest 
that customers in the 25- to 44-year-old age bracket show 
the most comfort with Internet and mobile technologies 
and are the early adopters of new digital banking offers. 
14  Competition policy is motivated not only by the desire to protect 
consumers from detriment associated, for example, with mispricing 
on the part of service providers, but also with a view towards ensuring 
market forces work to enhance the efficiency of allocation within the 
financial sector and between the financial sector and the rest of the 
economy.
Uptake tends to decline for customers aged 45 years and 
older.
The younger, presumably more digitally savvy de-
mographic segment is more drawn to digital financial 
services, given the added convenience, increased transpar-
ency, and availability of offerings that are more tailored 
to their more mobile, digital-based existence. In contrast, 
customers in the older demographic group are more likely 
to be involved in a long-term banking relationship with 
an existing provider and to perceive that loyalty carries 
benefits or simply that switching entails risks. For these 
customers, trust is likely to be gained only if they are 
confident that the same level of protection is available no 
matter which type of entity—branch-based or digital enti-
ty—is providing the financial services.
The benefits of digital banking innovations for cus-
tomers can include a superior and seamless customer 
experience, a wider range of products and services at a 
lower cost and potential for access to financial services 
for underserved customers (such as some SMEs) or the 
underbanked. But for safekeeping of funds, safety first 
seems to apply and for many retail savers that appears to 
mean deposit insurance. 
If security of the funds remains an indispensable aspect 
of digital retail banking services, as is the case for tradi-
tional arrangements, then in the absence of formal deposit 
insurance some other safety mechanism needs to be part 
of the digital banking solution. A fundamental question 
is whether a solution exists that provides an equivalent 
degree of safety without destroying the economic viability 
of the arrangement. If a cost-efficient solution does exist, 
a second question that arises is whether it is scalable.
Data limitations make it difficult to address this issue 
directly. But one can draw inferences from anecdotal ev-
idence. For example, many providers of digital banking 
initiatives that began as non-bank entities subsequently 
acquired or applied for a true banking license, which can 
bring eligibility for deposit insurance coverage. 
Table 8 shows features of selected digital banking ini-
tiatives that have applied for a banking license. Although 
the specific financial services provided by each entity are 
different, current accounts with a payment (mostly debit) 
card are provided in several instances. 
Other anecdotal evidence consistent with the impor-
tance of access to deposit insurance protection for digi-
tal banking initiatives is implicit in the communication 
strategies of new digital banks. Several digital banks are 
generally known to place a sharp focus on the interaction 
and communication they maintain with (voluntary) desig-
nated digital bank “communities”, which allow bank man-
agement to obtain direct feedback from the users of their 
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products and services. The existence of deposit insurance 
coverage for the banks’ current accounts, where they ex-
ist, is prominently featured in the promotional material the 
banks disseminate to advertise their product.
5.2.4 Automated Programming Interfaces
An alternative to the direct approach to deposit insur-
ance coverage is the use of contractual arrangements to 
innovate around the regulatory restrictions on access. 
One strategy that has been employed in several arrange-
ments involves a contractual agreement between the 
digital banking initiative and a traditional bank. Many 
Fintech initiatives do not involve holding clients’ money 
themselves, but instead pull money from clients’ current 
or credit card accounts. To the extent that they do hold 
customer funds, however, “e-money” regulations require 
the funds to be invested in liquid assets such as bank 
deposits or government bonds, so that any liquidity mis-
match is limited. An example is Revolut, which offers an 
e-wallet to hold, exchange and transfer fiat currencies, as 
well as cryptocurrencies via the Bitstamp cryptocurrency 
exchange, although a premium as opposed to standard ac-
count is required for customers to access services related 
to cryptocurrencies. 
In principle, deposit insurance applies to fiat currencies 
only and is typically restricted to legal domestic tender, 
but a smart contract can be used to automate transactions 
and processes, possibly shifting funds in and out of the 
perimeter of deposit insurance on demand, which allows 
the funds to benefit from deposit insurance while held at 
the bank (Figure 3).  
Many financial technology initiatives can be developed 
in this way. An example is discussed by Latimore and 
Greer [20], who in describing a Bitcoin platform suggest: 
“With Bitcoin.de, Fidor realized an API-supported re-
al-time settlement process that allows Fidor customers to 
trade their Bitcoins instantly by leveraging Fidor’s API in-
frastructure. This makes Bitcoin.de the only Bitcoin trad-
ing platform with a direct interface to the classic banking 
system powered by Fidor. Bitcoin transactions soon even 
could be shown within the Fidor SMART account, but no 
Bitcoins are stored.”
 












Perimeter of  




Figure 3. Stylised depiction of a contractual arrangement 
between a traditional bank and a Bitcoin-related initiative
Source: Authors’ assessments. 
Arrangements of this nature are characteristic of open 
bank models, whereby the bank retains the basic customer 
relationship via the current account or other transactions 
account, but with automatic access granted to external 
digital product offerings by virtue of an API link to the 
bank’s infrastructure. At the present stage, however, it 
is still too early to draw conclusions as to whether open 
banking or other scenarios will prevail.
Table 8. Features of selected new digital banking initiatives
Atombank Monzo N26 Revolut Fidor
Launch or bank charter 
date
Bank license in 
June 2015.
February 2015.Bank 
license in April 2017.
February 2013. Bank 
license in July 2016.
July 2015. E-money 
license, but applied for 
bank license 2017.
Founded as digital bank in 
2009.
Base United Kingdom United Kingdom Germany United Kingdom Germany
Products
Personal finance 
app, then savings 
account, loans and 
mortgages.
Iinitially a pre-
paid card, but now 
transitioning existing 
customers to current 
account. Optional 
overdrafts (against a 
fee) if eligible.
Current account with 
Mastercard, using 
TransferWise, Google 
Pay and Apple Pay.
Debit card and currency 
exchange app. Business 
account. E-wallet to hold 
and transfer cryptocurren-
cy via Bitstamp exchange. 
Peer-to-peer loans.
Current account with (deb-
it) Mastercard and savings 
account. “Crowdinvesting” 
and “Crowdfunding” added 
to banking platform.
Deposit insurance FSCS FSCS German banks None German banks
Investors
Broad base includ-
ing venture capital 
firms and BBVA.
Venture capital firms. Venture capital firms, Allianz X and Tencent. Venture capital firms.
Acquired in 2016 by 
BCPE.
Note: These new digital banking initiatives (not all of them are legally banks) are also sometimes referred to as ‘neo banks’ so as to distinguish them 
from digital arms of traditional banks. That said, traditional banks may well be directly or indirectly invested in these banks. FSCS is the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme in the United Kingdom. The label German banks refers to the statutory compensation scheme for German banks 
(Entschädigungseinrichtung deutscher Banken). The term “license” refers to a bank license. The company Revolut announced on 13 December 2018 
that the ECB has approved the company’s application for a European banking license.
Source: Authors’ assessments based on CBInsights [9] and company websites.
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Digital providers appear to have several advantages 
over incumbents, including importantly, their adaptability 
to individual client needs. Unencumbered by legacy infra-
structures and focused on only a few core services, new 
digital banking initiatives can offer a more tailored, faster, 
and more cost-effective service. But to whom? 
5.2.5 Institutions vs. Functions
As the discussion above indicates, Fintech initiatives are 
engaged in many of the same activities as commercial 
banks, including a few that make banks special under the 
FSN (Table 9). They offer benefits of speed, convenience, 
and lower costs for most retail payments and transactions 
services. They also offer safekeeping accounts, but the 
only way they have found, so far, to match the comfort 
and safety consumers feel with insured deposits is either 
to enter into contractual arrangements to acquire coverage 
indirectly or to convert to a bank charter to acquire cov-
erage directly. Retail customers appear not only to prefer 
deposit insurance for their savings accounts but also make 
distinctions among the providers of the guarantees. Either 
way, the preference consumers demonstrate for safety of 
their deposits has thus far favoured banking institutions 
over non-bank providers. 
The need to maintain the integrity of the deposit insur-
ance system argues in favour of limiting deposit insurance 
coverage to institutions that are subject to the appropriate 
regulation and supervision. That explains why several dig-
ital banking initiatives have sought banking licences. 
Table 9 shows two major exceptions between the func-
tions that make banks special under the FSN and those 
performed by digital banking initiatives. They are matu-
rity transformation and serving as conduits for the trans-
mission of monetary policy, as shown by the grey shaded 
corresponding cells. These exceptions are important. 
Table 9. Functions of banks and digital banking initiatives
Functions that make banks “special” 
under the FSN
Functions of digital banks and other 
FinTech initiatives
Safekeeping (deposit taking) Safekeeping (eW); Deposit taking (DB)
Offering transactions accounts 
(redeemable in cash on demand)
Offering transactions accounts (DB, 
eW)
Liquidity provision Liquidity provision (DB, eW)
Maturity transformation
Clearing and settling payments Facilitating the exchange of pay-ments DB, eW, API)
Serving as conduits for transmis-
sion of monetary policy
Source: Authors’ assessments.
One might recall from the discussion on banks and 
the financial safety net that the fundamental reasons why 
traditional banks as institutions are considered special re-
flects the specific combination of three functions that they 
perform, which imply maturity transformation. The three 
functions are:
(1) taking deposits that are withdrawable on demand 
and at par and on-lending funds;
(2) providing liquidity to other banks and non-banks, 
thus effectively engaging in maturity transformation;
(3) serving as conduit for monetary policy transmis-
sion.
The literature on why banks are special implies that this 
mix of functions explains why banks, as institutions, are 
given access to all financial safety net components (Figure 
4) and why the boundaries of the FSN have tended to be 
focused on institutions rather than functions. In any event, 
banks have been the only institutions that provide all three 
relevant functions.
What makes a bank special depends at least in part 
on legislation, which changes over time and is adapted 
to changes in the institutional provision of banking-like 
financial services. But the specialness of banks also de-
pends crucially on decisions of the central banking com-
munity to support a system of intermediation based largely 
on the provision of central bank money to and withdrawal 
of central bank money from commercial banks. The sight 
deposits that commercial banks hold with the central bank 
are particularly important in this context, as they are used 
for the settlement of payment transactions. Therefore, 
the importance of banks as conduits of monetary policy 
should not be minimised when thinking about which types 
of entities should be covered by the full financial safety 
net.
Such an argument does not, however, preclude the 
separable availability of selected safety net components 
to a broader list of service providers, but these com-
ponents will likely exclude access to the central bank 
balance sheet and the lender-of-last-resort function. 
The exception means that new digital Fintech initia-
tives can offer some banking services, but those entities 
unaffiliated with incumbent banks and lacking a bank-
ing charter will not have formal access to the lender-
of-last resort function. Moreover, as they are currently 
not sufficiently important systemically or otherwise, 
they would also not be expected to have access to the 
(non-explicit) guarantor-of-last-resort function, which 
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Figure 4. Financial safety net provisions
Note: Traditionally, the financial safety net was defined as consisting 
of a lender of last resort and a deposit insurance function (which could 
include special bank failure resolution regimes) and, as a counterbalance 
for the privileges associated with these functions, a regulatory and super-
visory framework. The policy response to the recent global financial cri-
sis consisted effectively of making available the government-supported 
function of guarantor-of-last-resort in more explicit form, thus changing 
the design of the financial safety net. Governments and central banks 
provided a wide range of explicit guarantees for the liabilities and some-
times assets of financial institutions and in particular banks. As a result 
of these interventions, a fourth function has been added to the traditional 
financial safety net in more explicit form.
Source: Schich [25].  
5.3 Conduits for Monetary Policy Transmission
At the peak of the global financial crisis, the perimeter 
of the FSN was extended, but subsequently a declared 
policy objective has been to clarify that so-called shad-
ow banking activities are excluded from the perimeter of 
the FSN.15 According to Adrian and Ashcraft [2], shadow 
banking consists of financial intermediation that involves 
credit, maturity and liquidity transformation, thus creating 
financial stability risks, but without the access to the FSN 
provisions that banks have.
Banks are special at least to some extent because they 
have been made "special” by central banks, mainly on 
account of their role as the main conduits through which 
monetary policy actions are transmitted to the real econ-
omy. In this regard, Huertas [19] notes, however, that some 
change is taking place. For example, central banks have 
broadened the perimeter of entities that form part of the 
monetary policy transmission channel. In particular, via 
15  The most recent discussions of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
suggest to use the term “non-bank financial intermediation” instead 
shadow banking, but for simplicity and conformity with common 
references, the present discussion continues to refer to shadow banking 
activities.
quantitative easing policies and other measures, central 
banks have broadened the group of counterparties they 
use beyond banks. Thus, at least along this dimension, 
banks have become somewhat less special.
Traditionally, central banks mainly used banks to trans-
mit monetary policy impulses to the economy. The policy 
rate set by central banks has either been the rate at which 
the central bank lends to banks or the rate at which banks 
can borrow central bank money in the market. Central 
banks have conducted monetary policy by either directly 
lending to banks or by conducting open market operations 
with them. As a result of these measures, the level of cen-
tral bank reserves at banks is altered, which in turn affects 
the banks’ capacity to lend to finance economic activity.
Under quantitative easing policies, central banks inter-
act with securities markets and investors in a more direct 
way. Central banks determine the eligibility of assets as 
collateral for lending and repurchase activity and they 
directly acquire a range of assets via open market opera-
tions. In the process, central bank decisions on the range 
of securities eligible as collateral for central bank open 
market operations became an additional monetary policy 
tool, the effects of which go beyond the banking sector. 
In fact, the choice of the new apparatus of monetary pol-
icy tools results, in part, from the view that the relatively 
weak economic recovery, especially in Europe, even after 
a decade following the global financial crisis was due to 
the improper functioning of the traditional monetary poli-
cy transmission channel.
Yet another potential challenge for the role of banks as 
conduits for monetary policy transmission might derive 
from cryptocurrencies, which could be public or private. 
The latter are non-convertible into cash, although they 
might be convertible into other cryptocurrencies or ser-
vices. As a general rule, they lack any intrinsic value and 
a recent report by the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) is rather sceptical as to the potential of private cryp-
to currencies to rival legal tender. Yet another scenario 
would be issuance of public cryptocurrency, which could 
be legal tender. Thus far, however, the odds of this hap-
pening anytime in the near term seem remote.
5.4 Unbundling vs Bundling Retail Banking Ser-
vices – The Current State of Play
5.4.1 Potential Outcomes of Technological Ad-
vances
A lot of attention in the popular press has focused on the 
challenges the digital transformation poses for incum-
bents. Researchers have postulated for quite some time 
that the advance of technology and the related decline in 
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information asymmetries would lead to an unbundling of 
the value chain for banking services. This hypothesis has 
been explored recently in the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision’s investigation of the implications of Fin-
tech developments for the banking sector  [3]. 
Five potential scenario outcomes were put forward 
(Figure 5), ranging from the survival of incumbent insti-
tutions in the guise of the “better bank”, achieved through 
the successful digital transformation of established play-
ers, to the fully “disintermediated bank”, which has been 
replaced by peer-to-peer systems. Intermediate outcomes 
include, toward the negative side for incumbents, the 
“relegated bank”, which continues to exist and supply 
products, but for which the customer relationship has 
been ceded to new players. This outcome contrasts with 
the “open bank” scenario, whereby the bank retains the 
customer relationship, but in an open architecture charac-
terized by the pass-through of products from third-party 
providers and partners. A fifth scenario reflects the entry 
of new players.
Figure 5. Understanding the challenges of the digital 
revolution -- five scenarios
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [3].
5.4.2 Scale and Scope Without Mass
Finance has been digitalising for some decades now 
and while the pace of change has certainly quickened of 
late the impact has thus far been less pronounced than in 
some other sectors of the economy, such as media and re-
tail shopping venues. It seems highly unlikely that finance 
will avoid some upheaval, given that the digital trans-
formation is pervading all sectors of the economy and 
encompasses all customer types (i.e. individuals, profes-
sionals, small enterprises, corporate businesses, and inves-
tors). It is thus not surprising that surveys of senior bank 
officials suggest that bank managers take the competitive 
threat coming from the ongoing digital transformation of 
banking seriously. Abstracting from the hype that often 
accompanies periods of rapid innovation, there are several 
practical reasons why.
The conversion of information from analogue to digital 
forms, along with the development of application systems 
and platforms, is changing the nature of assets that gener-
ate value, how ownership is imparted and where value is 
generated. This development fosters changes in the struc-
ture and operation of markets, allows mini-economies or 
ecosystems to be formed and, built on the connectivity of 
the Internet, ultimately encourages changes in the nature 
of relationships, both social and economic. In particular, 
the ability to code and store information in standardised 
form lowers a broad range of transactions costs and pro-
vides a common framework for interaction and the de-
velopment of customised relationships. There are direct 
parallels to banking.
Recall from the discussion above that the defining 
characteristic of the retail financial services segment has 
been the importance of the long-term relationship between 
the bank and the retail customer/client. The historically 
face-to-face nature of the relationship helped to explain 
the effort and investment incumbent banks devoted to 
developing or acquiring direct distribution channels. The 
problem with retail distribution infrastructure such as the 
branch-based network of commercial banks is that they 
tend to be very costly to establish and maintain. To make 
them cost-effective requires distributing a high enough 
volume or value of products and services through them to 
cover all costs, including the staff and branch costs of mo-
bilising and administering the products.
The benefits are that branch networks can support many 
different product lines. The retail financial services seg-
ment encompasses transactions services (e.g. payments), 
lending, savings and safekeeping, investments, insurance, 
and financial advice. Commercial banks have traditionally 
offered a bundle of these products and services.
Scope economies could exist in these arrangements if, 
for example, consumers perceived the all-in costs of pur-
chasing multiple products from a single supplier to be less 
than the costs of purchasing them from multiple sellers. 
Lower search costs could be a factor in this regard. There 
could be a positive reputation effect as well if customers 
associate additional products and services from a known 
provider with a certain measure of quality. For the bank, the 
ability to cross-sell new products to a given customer over 
time is a core aspect of the profitability of the relationship.
The digital transformation of finance introduces new 
dimensions to the concepts of scale and scope. In contrast 
to physical products and distribution channels, which can 
entail high fixed costs and significant marginal costs that 
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decline with scale, digital financial products may have 
high initial fixed costs associated with software and appli-
cation development, but little if any marginal costs. This 
feature, combined with global distribution potential via 
the Internet, can enable digital providers and platforms to 
achieve scale without mass; that is, with very few employ-
ees or tangible assets, the same as for other sectors that 
have undergone the digital transformation.
The potential for scope economies also exists in the 
digital environment. Just as high switching costs can cause 
retail customers of traditional banks to become locked-
in with their existing service provider, digital applications 
and data can be managed to reduce the cognitive costs to 
users, which can help to attract, engage, and maintain re-
lationships over time. These practices also produce “lock 
in” effects to the extent users become accustomed to the 
look and feel of particular applications and the portability 
across them. The applications can then be used to provide 
additional products and services, once the necessary con-
form level has been reached.
For banks, products and services on the asset side need 
to be priced to cover all operating costs, including staff 
and branch costs, costs of loan-loss provisions, and the 
cost of capital. Under normal circumstances, the total 
revenues from the cluster of financial products offered 
by banks exceed total costs and banks are profitable 
on a portfolio-wide basis. But on a component basis, 
the results can be quite different. Importantly, revenues 
from products and services for which the bank has some 
pricing power may be used to subsidise those from more 
competitive market segments where margins are lower. A 
prime example comes from credit card users. Customers 
who maintain outstanding account balances over multiple 
billing cycles are charged high fees and constitute a major 
source of profits for providers. Payments have been called 
the proverbial “cash cow” for banks, which no doubt ex-
plains why this source of revenues is the primary target of 
digital alternatives, in several cases with the explicit sup-
port of policymakers.
In addition to the open banking initiatives noted above 
are other measures directed at the cost of retail payments. 
They include measures in jurisdictions such as Australia, 
Canada and Europe that aim to limit the fees charged on 
transactions. EU interchange fee regulation is designed 
explicitly to cap interchange fees and weaken so-called 
“honour all cards” rules, which prevent merchants from 
refusing any cards bearing the same logo as other cards 
they already accept. The rule changes seek to enable mer-
chants to refuse high-fee cards.
The lower operating costs of digital initiatives and 
innovative use of digital technologies allow for new 
business models and revenue propositions. Some arrange-
ments are a straightforward pass-through of lower costs. 
For example, in the payment card area, new digital-based 
lenders target the most profitable customers of traditional 
card providers, those who carry balances forward, but 
offer them much lower interest rates. The payments area 
also features low-fee and even no-fee business models.
5.4.3 New Digital Banking Initiatives
Apart from more favourable pricing, many digital finan-
cial initiatives seek to provide greater customisation of 
the products and services they offer. For some types of 
financial products and services, customers have similar 
demands, which allow for standardisation of products and 
widespread distribution. Where that is the case, provid-
ers have sought to build or acquire economies of scale in 
production or in distribution. Money market mutual funds 
and similar types of pro rata asset management products 
are one example. Armed with new digital technologies 
and applications, new banking initiatives have moved in 
the opposite direction, toward greater customisation but 
with simpler propositions (Table 10).
Table 10. New digital banking initiatives
Type of entity Product offerings
Digital banks Deposits, savings, payments, foreign exchange
Digital wallets Retail payments, transactions accounts
Marketplace lenders Lending
APIs Payments, foreign exchange, cash manage-ment, trade finance
Source: Authors’ assessments.
Many new digital banking initiatives appear to have 
ample start-up and venture capital funding and seem to be 
engaged in a quest to win market share. The digital trans-
formation of other sectors has featured this core strategy, 
whereby ample digital capacity and the perceived advan-
tages of scale encourage and justify bearing short-term 
losses while scaling up to gain market share and future 
profitability. Customers clearly benefit in the expansion 
phase from greater convenience and choice, and low 
prices. For some digital banking initiatives, especially in 
the payments area, low pricing takes the form of the “no 
fee” model. Customers become conditioned to expect low 
prices as more start-ups enter and adopt the new pricing 
model, which forces incumbents to follow suit.16
In the case of lending platforms, many are still making 
losses, as they have not yet achieved a sufficient scale to 
cover their fixed costs. Achieving scale is thus a key aim 
for many platforms. For some, scale seems to require the 
16  See, for example, Beaudemoulin et al. [4].
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involvement of institutional investors. For example, one 
solution has been to arrange partnerships whereby institu-
tional investors automatically finance the project if retail 
funding is insufficient. Concerns have been expressed that, 
given the interest in institutional investor investments, the 
latter might be given preferential or exclusive access to 
certain loans or information or the option to opt out from 
certain segments of the market [15]. 
In the longer term, a no-fee model for an entity offering 
a limited product range is a questionable revenue proposi-
tion, which means new initiatives must eventually devel-
op and deploy priced services, adopt a different revenue 
model, or be absorbed into the ecosystem of a multi-prod-
uct entity. Consolidation has been a common outcome in 
markets subject to excess capacity and some new digital 
banking initiatives have been acquired by incumbent pro-
viders or by other entities seeking to expand their scale 
or make their own inroads. Other initiatives attempt to 
remain independent by relying on new revenue streams, 
obtained for example from exploiting their data or earning 
commissions on customer referrals. The long-term success 
of these approaches is not yet clear.
It is likely that increasing competition, induced by the 
entry of digital alternatives into the payments ecosystem, will 
put downward pressure on margins from payments services. 
This outcome is one of the main intended consequences of 
new regulatory initiatives. The pressure on margins will ap-
ply to all intermediaries that provide such services. What it 
implies for profitability depends on the structure of costs for 
individual service providers and the role payments services 
play in their overall business model.17 
Under increasing pressure from competitors, banks do 
expect to see a continued reduction in fees – and even an 
expansion of the no-cost model – on payment means (cash, 
bank cards, checks, transfers and direct debits), brokerage 
services for unit-linked contracts or collective investment 
scheme units, and more generally, on everyday banking 
services where customers feel autonomous. There are 
many client segments in retail banking, not all of which 
are especially price sensitive. Most savers who select a 
liquid account are more interested in greater access to 
their savings and the safety of their funds than in higher 
interest earnings.
Hence, while some financial products may, at a basic 
level, be recognised as the same sort of product – that is, 
a retail deposit account is a retail deposit account – they 
are not generally speaking treated as perfect substitutes by 
the typical retail customer. There must also be appropriate 
17  The potential impact on profitability is one of the difficult challenges 
regulators face in designing measures to protect consumers – how to do 
so without unduly limiting institutions’ profitability and thereby their 
safety.
levels of customer protection, privacy and above all secu-
rity, and for some products, these concerns appear to dom-
inate price considerations. These considerations may limit 
the ability of some stand-alone digital banking initiatives 
to reach critical size. The entry of other already trusted en-
tities into the field, such as large online platforms or tech 
firms, could be a different story, however. 
6. Preliminary Conclusions
Banks’ performance of core economic functions is chal-
lenged to some extent by new and developing digital 
banking initiatives. The degree to which the latter pose a 
serious competitive threat differs from one specific func-
tion to another, and banks are increasingly part of these 
developments. In any case, the specific combination of 
different financial functions performed by banks remains 
unique and, thus, these entities continue to be at the core 
of the financial safety net. 
Such an argument does not, however, preclude the sep-
arable availability of selected safety net components, such 
as deposit insurance, to a broader list of service providers. 
But this would come with the likely exclusion of access 
to the central bank balance sheet and the lender-of-last-
resort function. Thus, while new digital Fintech initiatives 
can offer some banking services, those entities unaffiliated 
with incumbent banks and lacking a banking charter will 
not have formal access to the lender-of-last resort function 
and, as they are currently not sufficiently important sys-
temically or otherwise, they would also not be expected to 
have access to the (non-explicit) guarantor-of-last-resort 
function, which was provided during the recent episode of 
systemic financial distress. 
Digital banking initiatives serve as a reminder of the 
limits of an entity-based approach to regulation. The need 
for regulatory and supervisory approaches to Fintech to be 
in principle more activities-based rather than entity-based 
has been acknowledged for some time now, but in prac-
tise, the entry point for regulators and supervisors remains 
an entity. The unbundling and re-bundling of financial 
services implies that financial services are partly provided 
by incumbent banks and partly by new and more lightly (or 
un-) regulated digital initiatives.
Some safety net provisions are made available to (light-
ly) regulated Fintech initiatives, although it is not always 
clear whether they pay an adequate price in exchange. In 
particular, while newly formed digital banks benefit from 
and pay a price for deposit insurance, they also undertake 
activities that are certainly beyond the current perimeter 
of the financial safety net, such as providing e-wallets to 
hold, exchange and transfer private cryptocurrencies.
The outcome of the current wave of innovation will be 
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shaped by the regulatory response. There exists no widely 
agreed preferred approach in this regard, however. Both 
the environments for digital financial innovation and ex-
isting financial regulatory frameworks differ across coun-
tries.
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